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On 11th May 2015 news broke that King Salman of Saudi Arabia would not be attending a 
much lauded summit with US President Barack Obama and other leaders of the Gulf Co-
Operation Council. The summit had been organised to discuss the Iranian nuclear deal and 
was comprised of a meeting at the White House and then a day at the Presidential retreat, 
Camp David.1 The need for such a high profile meeting reflects the burgeoning tensions 
between Washington and Riyadh, primarily driven by concerns about any nuclear deal 
reached with Iran. Yet the nuclear crisis was not the only item on the agenda, on which Iraq, 
Syria and Saudi-led attacks on Houthi rebels in Yemen also featured. Across these agenda 
items, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry looms large, with this rivalry seen to be shaping events. 
While the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has oscillated between periods of hostility 
and potential rapprochement, in the past decade, relations between the two have soured. 
Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) there was a return to the 
revolutionary, resistance focussed - yet ultimately belligerent - rhetoric of Ruhollah 
Khomeini, which characterised the years following the revolution. Following Hassan 
Rouhani’s election to the office of President in 2013, there was hope that the pendulum 
would swing towards rapprochement, but given the emergence of opportunities fostered by 
the fragmentation of the Middle Eastern states’ system, the possibility of weakening the 
other – and strengthening the self – appears attractive.  
Roots, Revolutions and Battles for Legitimacy 
In understanding the contemporary rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is necessary to 
consider the historical roots of this enmity, driven by a legacy of conquest and interactions.  
During the empires of Cyrus the Great and Darius, where the Persian Empire stretched from 
the Eastern coast of Greece to the banks of the Indus,2 this was the largest empire that the 
world had seen at that time.  Arab military successes came much later, conquering much of 
Persia some 1100 years after Cyrus. These Arab military successes also brought Islam to 
Persia, ultimately leading many to convert to the Sunni strand of Islam. In the early 16th 
century, the 14 year old leader Ismail changed the religion of the territories from Sunni to 
Shi’a, ultimately culminating in sectarian difference manifesting at a state level, notably 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran.    
Despite this difference, the period after the formation of the Saudi Arabian state and before 
the Iranian revolution in 1979 was characterised by a degree of suspicion, but was not 
overtly hostile. The events of 1979 dramatically altered the dynamics of the Persian Gulf 
region, with the revolution in Iran bringing Islam to the forefront of the rivalry. The 
establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran would challenge a main source of Saudi Arabia’s 
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legitimacy, with the Al Saud historically securing legitimacy through Islam, being the 
protectors of the two holy places of Islam. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, 
Riyadh and Tehran both sought legitimacy from the Islamic world and in doing so, embarked 
on a cycle of rhetoric, which sought to increase the Islamic legitimacy of one and reduce it 
for the other. For instance, Khomeini referred to the House of Saud as corrupt, unworthy to 
be the guardians of the two holy mosques, and “traitors to the two holy shrines”,3 while the 
Al Saud referred to the regime in Tehran as Nazis.4 This competition escalated in 1987, 
when 400 Iranians were killed whilst making hajj in Saudi Arabia, although some that these 
events were provoked by Iranian agents.   
Inherent within the new Islamic Republic’s foreign policy goals was the notion of providing 
support to the mustazefin – or downtrodden - of the Muslim world. The idea of providing 
support to the downtrodden world is found within the history of Shi’ism, with notions of 
guilt and martyrdom, stemming from the murder of Hossein in the Battle of Karbala5 
manifesting in policy calculations. This became enshrined within Article 3.16 of the 
constitution, seemingly cementing ideas of revolutionary zeal within the minds of other 
actors in the region. As a result, fearing the expansionist aspirations of Khomeini, Saudi 
Arabia provided financial support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, furthering tensions 
between Riyadh and Tehran.  
Seemingly inspired by events in Iran, Shi’a groups in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, having 
experienced decades of discrimination and persecution, rose up against the state. This 
began a sustained campaign of resistance against the state,6 along with suggestions of 
Iranian manipulation within Saudi Arabia’s domestic affairs. Similarly, in Bahrain in 1981, the 
International Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, a Shi’a organisation operating with the 
support of Iran, launched a coup d’etat against the Sunni Al Khalifa ruling family. While 
ultimately unsuccessful, these events would prove integral in understanding future 
dynamics of the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Indeed, this event, coupled with the 
legacy of the Battle of Karbala, created the perception that Iran was behind unrest across 
the region, particularly within Shi’a communities.    
Arab Uprisings 
What has become clear in the previous decade is that neither Riyadh nor Tehran can resist 
an opportunity to strengthen the self and weaken the other. The rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran thus intensified with the opportunities that emerged after the onset of the 
Arab Uprisings. The series of protests that have become known as the Arab Uprisings began 
in December 2010 when Mohammad Bouazzizi self-immolated. Bouazzizi’s actions reflected 
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a growing dissatisfaction at socio-economic conditions in Tunisia, which were also felt by 
many across the wider Middle East and North African region. Authoritarian regimes across 
the region faced discontent from their populations, which often began to manifest in large 
scale protests that were then met with force by regimes across the region. The intensity of 
the rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran increases when states begin to fragment and actors 
have to look for alternatives to the state to secure their identities. Indeed, the 
fragmentation of state-society relations provided scope for external interference within 
states, but also, it created opportunities for the perception of Iranian interference. 
Ultimately though, the challenges to regime-society stability across the region created 
opportunities for the escalation of a zero-sum proxy conflict, often at the expense of 
populations of the state. 
Cultivating Sectarianism 
In light of the fragmentation of regime-society relations and the disintegration of state 
sovereignty, sectarian identities have become an increasingly important point of reference 
and security. It is important to note, however, that these sectarian divisions are often 
created in pursuit of the strategic ends of various actors.  
In the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saudi Arabia and Iran increased their 
influence across Iraq, offering support to actors typically along sectarian lines. In Lebanon 
the nature of competition is somewhat different, with Riyadh and Tehran providing financial 
and political support to the March 14th and March 8th alliances respectively.7  
Since the Arab Uprisings, however, sectarian identities have increasingly been used as a 
means of framing conflicts in different ways whilst also locating them within broader 
geopolitical narratives. This can be seen in Bahrain, where the Al Khalifa regime sought to 
frame an initially pro-democracy, non-sectarian protest as sectarian motivated. In doing so, 
the Al Khalifa secured the loyalty of those Sunnis who had previously taken to the streets by 
inciting fears about Iranian influence across the archipelago, but also locating the protests 
within the broader geopolitical rivalry that is shaping the region. In the immediate 
aftermath of the #Feb14 protests, a Saudi-led GCC military force entered Bahrain and 
helped to secure the Al Khalifa regime. While there is little evidence to suggest that Iran is 
behind the unrest, anecdotally, the perception that Tehran is manipulating events across 
the archipelago is paramount. 
Bahrain is clearly not the only example of a sectarian master-narrative being constructed for 
political or geopolitical purposes. Events in Syria since the emergence of protests in early 
2011 have increasingly taken on a sectarian nature, again, in an effort to both secure the 
Assad regime within his ostensibly Shi’a support base, but also locating the conflict within 
the broader rivalry. For Iran, ensuring the survival of the Assad regime is imperative, for 
both influence across Syria but also to facilitate support for Hizballah, in Lebanon. For Saudi 
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Arabia, the protesters provided an opportunity to win Syria back “to the Arab fold”8 and to 
reduce Iranian influence, both in Syria and Lebanon.  
It can also be seen in Yemen, where the Saudi-led bombing campaign against Houthi rebels - 
who are believed to be supported by Iran - has resulted in the deaths of over 1600 people.9  
Houthis subscribe to the Zaidi strand of Shi’a Islam and as such, many believe them to be a 
proxy actor of Tehran,10 with perception once more shaping responses.  
Complicating this sectarian framing, of course, is the emergence of daesh11 in Syria and Iraq, 
whose vociferously anti-Shi’a posturing sets them against Iran, but their violently 
fundamentalist, Salafist ideology is of paramount concern to Saudi Arabia. If the rivalry 
between Riyadh and Tehran was purely driven by sectarian concerns then daesh would 
provide an additional opportunity to weaken Iranian influence.  
Regional Security and Strategic Ends 
Underpinning this discussion are questions about the nature of regional security, both 
within the Persian Gulf and wider Middle East. Riyadh and Tehran have different 
perceptions of how best to achieve regional security and what that might look like.  Given its 
perceived history as a ‘natural state’, free from colonial interference, Iran sees itself as 
uniquely qualified12 to ensure the security of the Gulf region, free from external 
interference. In contrast, however, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states have been reliant 
upon the United States to ensure their security since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  
However, changing views of the US could be complicating the nature of regional security, 
with Riyadh increasingly concerned at an apparently burgeoning rapprochement between 
Washington and Tehran. 
Of course, underpinning all of these questions are strategic calculations, within which the 
rivalry is viewed in zero-sum terms, wherein a win for one is seen as a loss for the other and 
vice versa. Domestic concerns are increasingly important in light of the construction of a 
growing sectarian conflict, coupled with perceptions of the other’s involvement within these 
issues. While a change in political leadership in both Riyadh and Tehran seemingly provided 
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scope for a thawing in relations, ultimately, opportunity seems to be trumping 
consolidation.    
 
 
